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SYMMETRIC CONVEX GAMES
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Abstract
We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and My-
erson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We
show that with at most ve players the full cooperation structure results according
to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the game is strictly convex
then every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in a structure that is payo
equivalent to the full cooperation structure. Subsequently, we analyze a game with
six players that is symmetric and strictly convex. We show that there exists a sub-
game Nash equilibrium that results in an incomplete structure in which two players
are worse o than in the full cooperation structure, whereas four players are better
o. Independent of the initial order any pair of players can end up being exploited.
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cation numbers: C71, C72
Keywords: symmetric convex game, undirected graph, link formation, incom-
plete stable structure
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In this paper the following question takes a central place: which cooperation structure
between economic agents is likely to form? This question was rst raised by Aumann
and Myerson (1988). In their model the economic possibilities of the agents are described
by a cooperative game, and the formation process of bilateral communication links by
an extensive form game, in which pairs of players get the opportunity to form a link
according to some specic rule of order, and the payos to the players are eventually
determined by means of the Myerson value (cf. Myerson (1977)). Assuming that every
player takes decisions to his own advantage, Aumann and Myerson (1988) already note
that for superadditive games this process may lead to partial cooperation. In van den
Nouweland (1993) it is conjectured that for convex games the complete cooperation
structure can always be reached by letting the agents act according to some subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. Holzman1 provided an example of a 5-person asymmetric
convex game for which there exists an incomplete stable cooperation structure. Stability
here means that if one considers the subgame of Aumann and Myerson's extensive form
game with this incomplete cooperation structure as the starting point, then forming no
additional links corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, Holzman does
not show that this particular structure can actually be reached. Feinberg (1998) presents
a simple weighted majority with an incomplete stable structure.
In this paper we focus on symmetric convex games. It turns out that, even in the case
that all players are symmetric, it is not only possible that an incomplete stable structure
exists, but also that it will form according to some subgame perfect equilibrium. More
precisely, we will show that in symmetric convex games with at most 5 players the full
cooperation structure can be formed in equilibrium and in symmetric games with at most
5 players that are strictly convex all structures that can be formed in equilibrium result
in the same payos as the full cooperation structure. Additionally, we analyze a 6-person
game that is symmetric and strictly convex. This analysis illustrates that the arguments
that suÆce to show that the full cooperation structure can result in symmetric convex
games with at most 5 players, cannot be extended to games with 6 (or more) players.
Moreover, we show that in this 6-person game, according to the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium concept, structures can result in which two players receive strictly less than
they would according to the full cooperation structure and four players receive strictly
more. In fact, it turns out that any pair of players can be exploited, independent of
the rule of order. We conclude with some remark on the inuence of the order on the
structures that result.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 some preliminaries about cooperative
1Unpublished, private communication.
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games and cooperation structures are provided. The model of Aumann and Myerson is
presented in section 3. Moreover, some results about the possible cooperation structures
according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept are given for general allo-
cation rules. In section 4 we focus on symmetric convex games with at most 5 players,
whereas in section 5 the 6-person example is studied in detail.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game is a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng denotes the set of players
and v : 2N ! IR with v(;) = 0 the characteristic function.
A cooperative game (N; v) is superadditive if for all T1  N and all T2  NnT1 it
holds that
v(T1) + v(T2)  v(T1 [ T2): (1)
A cooperative game (N; v) is convex if for all i 2 N and all T1  T2  N with i 2 T1 it
holds that
v(T1)  v(T1nfig)  v(T2)  v(T2nfig): (2)
So, a game is convex if the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is less than
his marginal contribution to a larger coalition. A cooperative game is strictly convex if
(2) holds with strict inequality for all i 2 N and all T1  T2  N with i 2 T1.
Let N be a set of players and let R 2 2Nnf;g. The unanimity game (N; uR) is the
game with uR(S) = 1 if R  S and uR(S) = 0 otherwise (see Shapley (1953)). Every
game (N; v) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way,
i.e. v =
P
R22N nf;g R(v)uR. If there is no ambiguity about the underlying game we will
simply write (R)R22Nnf;g instead of (R(v))R22Nnf;g. The Shapley value  of a game is






for all i 2 N:
A (communication) graph is a pair (N;L) where the set of vertices N represents the
set of players and the set of edges L represents the set of bilateral (communication)
links. Two players i and j are directly connected i fi; jg 2 L. Two players i and j
are connected (directly or indirectly) i i = j or there exists a path between players i
and j. The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the player set into commu-
nication components, where two players are in the same communication component if
and only if they are connected. The set of communication components will be denoted
by N=L. The component C 2 N=L containing player i 2 N will be denoted by Ci(L).
Furthermore, denote the subgraph on the vertices in coalition S  N by (S; L(S)), where
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L(S) = ffi; jg 2 L j fi; jg  Sg, and the partition of S into communication components
according to graph (S; L(S)) by S=L. Furthermore, dene LN = ffi; jg j fi; jg  Ng.
Myerson (1977) studied communication situations (N; v; L) where (N; v) is a cooper-





v(C) for all S  N:
So, a coalition is split into communication components and the value of this coalition in
the graph-restricted game is then dened as the sum of the values of the communication
components in the original game. The Shapley value of the game (N; vL) is usually
referred to as the Myerson value of communication situation (N; v; L). Notation:
(N; v; L) = (N; vL):
In Borm et al. (1992) another allocation rule for communication situation is studied,
the position value. This value determines the payo to the players in two steps. First, a
value for each communication link is determined, as the Shapley value of a game where
the original communication links are the players. Then, each player receives half of the
value of all the links he is involved in. Recently, Hamiache (1999) introduced yet another
allocation rule for communication situations.
The analysis in this paper concentrates on symmetric games. A game (N; v) is sym-
metric if there exist v1; v2; : : : ; vjN j 2 IR such that v(S) = vjSj for all S 2 2Nnf;g. So, in
a symmetric game the value of a coalition only depends on its size.
3 A model of link formation
In this section we describe the model of link formation introduced by Aumann and
Myerson (1988). Furthermore, we will introduce some notation dealing with subgame
perfect Nash equilibria and derive some preliminary results.
Let (N; v) be a cooperative game with jN j  2 and let  be an allocation rule for
communication situations. Let  be an exogenously given order of pairs of players. For-
mally,  : LN !
n





is a bijection where (fi; jg) = k denotes that pair fi; jg
is in position k. We will denote the link formation game in extensive form determined
by cooperative game (N; v), allocation rule , and initial order  by lf(N; v; ; ). The
game starts with no links formed. The rst pair of players according to  gets the oppor-
tunity to form a link. This link is actually formed if both players agree on forming this
link. If a link is formed, it cannot be broken in a further stage of the game. After a pair
of players decided on whether or not to form a link, the next pair of players according to
 who did not form a link with each other yet, gets the opportunity to do so. After the
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last pair of players in the order has had the opportunity to form a link, the rst pair of
players in the order who did not form a link with each other yet, gets a new opportunity
to form the link between them. The process stops when, after the last link that has
been formed, all pairs of players who have not formed a link with each other yet, have
had a nal opportunity to do so and declined this oer. Throughout the process of link
formation the entire history of acceptances and rejections is known to all players. This
process results in a set of links, which represents in conjunction with the player set an
undirected graph. We will denote this set of links by L. The payos to the players are
then determined by the allocation rule, i.e., if (N;L) is formed player i 2 N receives
i(N; v; L):
In the original model of Aumann and Myerson (1988) player i receives his Myerson value
i(N; v; L). We will mainly restrict ourselves to the Myerson value too. Borm (1990)
studies several examples using the position value rather than the Myerson value.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) already argued that since the game of link formation is
of perfect information it has subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Furthermore, they note
that the order in which two players in a pair decide whether or not to form a link has
no inuence (on the outcome of the game). Either order leads to the same outcome as
simultaneous choice.
Though decisions in a link formation game in extensive form are made by the players,
we will, with a slight abuse of notation, sometimes refer to a decision of a link where
we actually mean the decisions of the players in the (potential) link. Consider such a
decision of a link and assume that strategies are xed after the decision of this link. If
both players (weakly) prefer to form the link then we call the choice of the link to form
the link subgame perfect. Furthermore, if at least one player (weakly) prefers not to
form the link then we call the choice of the link not to form the link subgame perfect.
We remark that if links play subgame perfect then one can easily determine subgame
perfect play of the players that results in the same outcome.
We are interested in subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the link formation game
in extensive form. To analyze these equilibria we need to study subgames. Let  be
an allocation rule for communication situations and let (N; v) be a game in strate-
gic form. A link formation game in extensive form in which the links in A have
already been formed is denoted by lf (N; v; ; ; A), with A  LN a set of links,
and  : LNnA !
n







an order of the pairs of players who did not
form a link with each other yet. If L is the set of links that have been formed
in the game then player i 2 N receives i(N; v; L [ A). Furthermore, note that
lf (N; v; ; ; ;) = lf (N; v; ; ). We denote the set of subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria of lf (N; v; ; ) by SPNE(lf (N; v; ; )) and, similarly, the set of subgame
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perfect Nash equilibria of lf(N; v; ; ; A) by SPNE(lf (N; v; ; ; A)). Note that
lf (N; v; ; ; A) is interesting in itself since it describes a process of link formation
when some links have been formed already.
To describe every subgame of lf (N; v; ; ) we denote for all A  LN , all or-
ders  : LNnA !
n












  jAj   1g the game
lf (N; v; ; ; A; k) representing a link formation game in extensive form in which the
links in A have already been formed and, after the last link has been formed k pairs of
players have had the opportunity to form a link and have refused to do so. So, the link
fi; jg with (fi; jg) = k + 1 is next to decide whether or not they want to form a link.
Note that lf (N; v; ; ; A; 0) = lf (N; v; ; ; A).
Consider the link formation game lf (N; v; ; ). Let A  LN and fi; jg 2 A. Denote
by A;fi;jg the order restricted to L
NnA that results when the links in A have been formed
and fi; jg 2 A is the link in A that has been formed last. Then lf (N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A)





  jAj   1g
we have that lf(N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A; k) is a subgame of 
lf(N; v; ; ). In fact, any
subgame of lf (N; v; ; ) can be described in this way. Finally, we note that
lf (N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A; k) does not uniquely determine a subgame, since the links in
Anffi; jgg can have been formed in several orders.
We will introduce some additional notation dealing with graphs that result according
to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a link formation game and its subgames. Firstly,
we call a graph (N;L) a perfect equilibrium graph if there exists a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium that results in the graph (N;L). We denote the set of perfect equilibrium
graphs in lf (N; v; ; ) by PEG(N; v; ; ). Similarly, we denote the set of graphs
that result according to subgame perfect equilibria in a subgame lf (N; v; ; ; A) by
PEG(N; v; ; ; A).
Let (N;L) be a graph and let  be an order of the links in LNnL. The graph (N;L) is
called -stable with respect to cooperative game (N; v) and allocation rule  if (N;L) 2
PEG(N; v; ; ; L). If there is no ambiguity about (N; v) and  we will sometimes simply
call such a graph -stable. A graph (N;L) is called (strongly) stable with respect to
cooperative game (N; v) and allocation rule , or simply stable, if it is -stable for all
orders . For notational convenience, we call the full cooperation structure stable, though
no associated subgame starting with this graph is dened.
Furthermore, a graph (N;L) is called superstable with respect to (N; v) and , or
simply superstable, if (N;L) is the unique element of PEG(N; v; ; ; L) for all orders .
For notational convenience the full cooperation structure is called superstable as well.
The following lemma deals with a condition on the allocation rule that ensures that
the full cooperation structure can result according to a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. This condition states that for all communication structures there exist two players
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who are not connected with each other directly and who both (weakly) prefer the full
cooperation structure to the current structure.
Lemma 3.1 Let (N; v) be a cooperative game, let  be an allocation rule for communi-
cation situations, and let  be an order on the set of all pairs of players. If for all L  LN
there exist i; j 2 N with i 6= j and fi; jg 62 L satisfying i(N; v; L)  i(N; v; LN) and
j(N; v; L)  j(N; v; LN) then it holds that (N;LN) 2 PEG(N; v; ; ).
Proof: Suppose that for all L  LN there exist i; j 2 N with i 6= j and fi; jg 62 L
satisfying i(N; v; L)  i(N; v; LN) and j(N; v; L)  j(N; v; LN). We will, in fact,
show that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that restricted to any sub-
game lf (N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A) with A  L
N and fr; tg 2 A results in the full cooperation
structure.
Consider the following strategy prole s. For any decision node let A denote the set
of links that have been formed so far and let player i be a player who has to make a
decision at this node. Let the strategy of player i be that he wants to form the proposed
link if i(N; v; A)  i(N; v; LN). Since for all L  LN there exist i; j 2 N with i 6= j
and fi; jg 62 L satisfying i(N; v; L)  i(N; v; L
N) and j(N; v; L)  j(N; v; L
N) it is
obvious that this strategy prole results in the formation of the full cooperation structure,
also if the strategy prole is restricted to some subgame lf(N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A).
It remains to show that this strategy prole is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
By backward induction we only have to show that for each subgame the choice at the
root according to s is subgame perfect assuming that the players choose according to s
at all decision nodes of this subgame except for the choice at the root.
Consider an arbitrary subgame lf(N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A; k). Suppose players i and j are
the rst pair of players who have to make a decision in lf(N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A; k). We
will distinguish between two cases: players i and j will form a link according to s and
players i and j will not form a link according to s.
Firstly, assume that players i and j form a link according to s, i.e., i(N; v; A) 
i(N; v; L
N) and j(N; v; A)  j(N; v; LN). Suppose player i deviates from his choice
at the root. If, according to s, no additional link is formed then (N;A) results. Al-
ternatively, if according to s at least one link is formed then by construction of s the
graph (N;LN) will result eventually. In both cases, player i does not strictly improve his
payo, implying that his choice according to s at the root of lf (N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A; k) is
subgame perfect. By symmetry a similar argument holds for player j.
Secondly, assume that players i and j do not form a link according to s. With-
out loss of generality assume that i(N; v; A) > i(N; v; L
N). Then according to s
one of the graphs (N;A) and (N;LN ) results. Suppose player i deviates from his
choice at the root. If this deviation has no eect on the formation of link fi; jg, i.e.,
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j(N; v; A) > j(N; v; L
N) as well, then this deviation has no eect on the graph that
results. Alternatively, if the deviation of player i results in the formation of link fi; jg
then, by construction of s, the graph (N;LN ) will result eventually. In both cases player
i does not strictly improve his payo. Player j cannot inuence the outcome of the game
by changing his strategy at the root since player i prevents the formation of the link
fi; jg at the root of lf (N; v; ; A;fr;tg; A; k) independent of the choice of player j.
We conclude that the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. 2
Although the previous lemma provides a suÆcient condition for the full coopera-
tion structure to be supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we cannot use
this lemma to show that a specic graph is not supported by a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. The following lemma deals with this issue.
Lemma 3.2 Let (N; v) be a cooperative game, let  be an allocation rule for commu-
nication situations, and let  be an order of all pairs of players. Let L  UGN be
a set of undirected graphs with (N;LN ) 2 L. If for all (N;L) 2 UGNnL there ex-
ist i; j 2 N with i 6= j and fi; jg 62 L satisfying both i(N; v; L) < i(N; v; L
0) and
j(N; v; L) < j(N; v; L
0) for all L0 2 L with L  L0 then PEG(N; v; ; )  L.
Proof: Assume that for all (N;L) 2 UGNnL there exist i; j 2 N with i 6= j and fi; jg 62
L satisfying both i(N; v; L) < i(N; v; L
0) and j(N; v; L) < j(N; v; L
0) for all L0 2 L
with L  L0. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
s that results in (N;L) 62 L. Hence, there exists at least one subgame of lf(N; v; ; ),
say lf (N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A), with (N;A) 62 L and (N;A) being A;fi;jg-stable, namely by
taking A = L and fi; jg the last link that has formed according to s. Consider the set of
subgames with this property and, subsequently, let lf (N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A) be a subgame
in this set with jAj maximal. Then, by assumption there exist r; t 2 N with r 6= t and
fr; tg 62 A satisfying both r(N; v; A) < r(N; v; L0) and t(N; v; A) < t(N; v; L0) for
all L0 2 L with A  L0. If r and t form a link then, by maximality of A and since
(N;LN) 2 L, it follows that some L0 2 L will result with r(N; v; L
0) > r(N; v; A) and
t(N; v; L
0) > t(N; v; A). So, at least one of the players r and t did not play subgame
perfect according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s0 in lf (N; v; ; A;fi;jg; A)
that resulted in (N;A). A contradiction. We conclude that the strategy prole s cannot
be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 2
The following lemma is similar to lemma 3.2 starting with an initial set of links rather
than with the empty graph. The proof is omitted since it is similar to the proof of lemma
9
3.2.
Lemma 3.3 Let (N; v) be a cooperative game, let  be an allocation rule for communi-
cation situations, let A  LN be an initial set of links, and let  be an order of all pairs
of players in LNnA. Let L  UGN be a set of undirected graphs with (N;LN) 2 L. If for
all (N;L) 2 UGNnL with A  L there exist i; j 2 N with i 6= j and fi; jg 62 L satisfying
both i(N; v; L) < i(N; v; L
0) and j(N; v; L) < j(N; v; L
0) for all L0 2 L with L  L0
then PEG(N; v; ; ; A)  L.
The lemmas above will play a prominent role in sections 4 and 5.
4 Symmetric convex games
The example of Holzman, to which we referred in the introduction, shows that it is not at
all obvious that the full cooperation structure will result according to a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium if the underlying game is convex. The current section and section
5 deal with the issue whether more can be said if in addition to convexity we assume
symmetry of the underlying game. In this section we restrict our analysis to symmetric
convex games with at most 5 players. Section 5 deals with a 6-person symmetric convex
game.
Restricting ourselves to symmetric games reduces the complexity of the analysis sig-
nicantly, since we can restrict ourselves to non-isomorphic graphs. Two graphs (N1; L1)
and (N2; L2) are isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the vertices
in N1 and those in N2 with the property that two vertices in N1 are connected directly in
(N1; L1) if and only if the corresponding vertices in N2 are connected directly in (N2; L2).
For example, graphs (f1; 2; 3g; ff1; 2gg) and (f1; 2; 3g; ff1; 3gg) are isomorphic. In fact,
all graphs with three vertices and one link are isomorphic. In a communication situa-
tion with a symmetric convex game the payo to a player only depends on his position
in the graph and not on the specic labelling of the players. Hence, we can reduce
the complexity of the analysis of symmetric games by calculating the payo vectors for
non-isomorphic graphs only.
The remainder of this section deals with subgame perfect Nash equilibria resulting in
the full cooperation structure if the underlying game is symmetric and convex. Lemma
3.1 will play a prominent role in showing that the full cooperation structure is always
supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in symmetric convex games with at
most 5 players if the Myerson value is used to determine the payos. No condition on
the initial order is required.
Before we present and prove the theorem we introduce some notation concerning
symmetric games, which will be convenient in the analysis of symmetric convex games
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later on. Recall that a game (N; v) is symmetric if there exist numbers v1; : : : ; vn such
that v(S) = vjSj for all S 2 2
Nnf;g.
We will describe a basis for the class of symmetric games with player set N . For all
j 2 f1; : : : ; ng dene the cooperative game (N;wj) by
wj(S) =
(
0 if jSj  j   1;
jSj+ 1  j if jSj  j:
Consider, for example, the 5-person cooperative game (N;w3). This game is described
by w3(S) = 0 if jSj  2 and w3(S) = jSj   2 if jSj  3.
If (N; v) is not only symmetric, but also convex then by denition the numbers
1 = v1;
2 = (v2   v1)  (v1   0);
3 = (v3   v2)  (v2   v1);
...
n = (vn   vn 1)  (vn 1   vn 2);
are such that 1 2 IR and 2  0; : : : ; n  0. These inequalities are strict if (N; v)
is strictly convex. Moreover, one easily veries that vi =
Pi
j=1(i + 1   j)j for every
i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
Combining vi =
Pi
j=1(i+1 j)j with the denition of (N;w
j) we obtain the following






We already noted that for any symmetric convex game it holds that 1 2 IR and
2  0; : : : ; n  0. On the other hand, one easily veries that for every 1 2 IR,
2  0; : : : ; n  0 the cooperative game (N; v), dened by (3), is a symmetric convex
game. If (N;L) is a graph and v is dened by (3) then, by linearity of the Myerson value,
we have





for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Since the cooperative games (N;wj), j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, form
a basis for the the set of symmetric games with player set N we can easily deter-
mine the Myerson value value of any communication situation (N; v; L) using the vector
(i(N;w
1; L); : : : ; (i(N;w
n; L)).
We will provide a systematic list of Myerson values for symmetric games with at most
5 players. In order to do so we will denote graphs by a binary representation. Links are
ordered in the following way:




A graph is denoted by a binary vector, where a 0 in the position of link fi; jg rep-
resents that fi; jg does not belong to the set of links, whereas a 1 in the position of
link fi; jg represents that fi; jg is a link in the graph. So, (1; 1; 0) represents graph
(f1; 2; 3g; ff1; 2g; f1; 3gg).
First, consider a cooperative game (N; v) with one player. Clearly, this player receives
v1 = 1 according to the Myerson value.
Secondly, consider a cooperative game (N; v) with two players. If (N;L) is the empty
graph, i.e., the graph with binary representation (0), then both players receive v1 =
1 1+0 2 according to the Myerson value, and hence their payos are identied with
the vector (1; 0). If (N;L) is the graph connecting both players, i.e., the graph with





2, and hence their payos
are identied with the vector (1; 1
2
).
Now, consider symmetric convex games with 3 players. Since the payo to a player,
according to the Myerson value, only depends on the characteristics of the component
he belongs to, it suÆces to consider connected graphs. The payos to the players in the
graphs with zero or one link already follow from the payos to the players for cooperative
games with 1 and 2 players, since the largest component contains at most 2 players.
Essentially, i.e., up to isomorphisms, there are only two connected graphs: those with 2
links and 3 links. The payos to the players in these two dierent graphs can be found
in table 1, where the vectors for the ease of computation have been multiplied by the
factor 60.
graph player 1 player 2 player 3
(1,1,0) (60,60,20) (60,30,20)* (60,30,20)*
(1,1,1) (60,40,20) (60,40,20) (60,40,20)
Table 1: Payos in communication situations with symmetric 3-person games.
For example, the payo to player 2 in graph (f1; 2; 3g; ff1; 2g; f1; 3gg) is given by
2(f1; 2; 3g; v; ff1; 2g; f1; 3gg) =
1
60




(v2   2v1) +
1
3











This follows from table 1, which states that for graph (1; 1; 0) the payo to player 2 is
described by (60; 30; 20). The stars (*) in table 1 and the following tables identify for
each non-complete graph two players who are not connected with each other directly and
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who both (weakly) prefer the full cooperation structure to the current structure. Since
the game (N; v) is convex we have i  0 for every i 2 f2; : : : ; ng. So, we can put a star
at every player in some non-complete graph if the corresponding vector is coordinate
wise smaller than the vector associated with this player in the complete graph and the
rst coordinates of both vectors coincide.
In order to obtain a complete description of the payos for symmetric games with
4 players, we supplement table 1 with a table that describes the payos for connected
graphs with 4 vertices. These payos can be found in table 2, where again the vectors
have been multiplied by the factor 60.
graph player 1 player 2 player 3 player 4
(1,1,1,0,0,0) (60,90,45,15) (60,30,25,15) (60,30,25,15)* (60,30,25,15)*
(1,1,0,0,1,0) (60,60,40,15) (60,60,40,15) (60,30,20,15)* (60,30,20,15)*
(1,1,1,1,0,0) (60,70,45,15) (60,40,25,15) (60,40,25,15)* (60,30,25,15)*
(1,1,0,0,1,1) (60,45,30,15)* (60,45,30,15) (60,45,30,15) (60,45,30,15)*
(1,1,1,1,1,0) (60,50,30,15) (60,50,30,15) (60,40,30,15)* (60,40,30,15)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1) (60,45,30,15) (60,45,30,15) (60,45,30,15) (60,45,30,15)
Table 2: Payos in communication situations with symmetric 4-person games.
Similarly, for symmetric convex games with 5 players we can use tables 1 and 2 if the
graph is not connected. In table 3 we provide the payos for connected 5-person graphs
only.
Using these three tables, we can prove the following theorem. We restrict ourselves to
games with at least two players since no link formation game has been dened associated
with a cooperative game with one player only.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N; v) be a symmetric convex game with at least 2 and at most 5
players. Then (N;LN) 2 PEG(N; v; ; ) for any order  of the links in LN .




than not forming a link and receive 1. From now on, assume that jN j  3.
In view of lemma 3.1 it suÆces to show that for all L  LN there exist i; j 2 N with
i 6= j and fi; jg 62 L satisfying i(N; v; L)  i(N; v; LN) and j(N; v; L)  j(N; v; LN).
Let L  LN . We will distinguish between two cases, jN=Lj > 1 and jN=Lj = 1.
Firstly, assume that jN=Lj > 1. Let C1; C2 2 N=L with C1 6= C2. By symmetry of
(N; v) and, hence, of (N; vL
N





for all i 2 N: (4)
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graph player 1 player 2 player 3 player 4 player 5
(1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (60,120,72,36,12) (60,30,27,21,12) (60,30,27,21,12) (60,30,27,21,12)* (60,30,27,21,12)*
(1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (60,90,65,33,12) (60,60,45,33,12) (60,30,25,18,12) (60,30,25,18,12)* (60,30,20,18,12)*
(1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (60,60,60,30,12) (60,60,40,30,12) (60,60,40,30,12) (60,30,20,15,12)* (60,30,20,15,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0) (60,100,72,36,12) (60,40,27,21,12) (60,40,27,21,12) (60,30,27,21,12)* (60,30,27,21,12)*
(1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0) (60,70,50,33,12) (60,70,50,33,12) (60,40,30,18,12) (60,30,25,18,12)* (60,30,25,18,12)*
(1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (60,70,65,33,12) (60,40,25,18,12) (60,40,25,18,12)* (60,60,45,33,12) (60,30,20,18,12)*
(1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (60,75,55,36,12) (60,45,35,21,12) (60,45,35,21,12) (60,30,25,21,12)* (60,45,30,21,12)*
(1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12)* (60,48,36,24,12)* (60,48,36,24,12)
(1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) (60,80,57,36,12) (60,50,32,21,12) (60,40,32,21,12) (60,40,32,21,12)* (60,30,27,21,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1) (60,80,72,36,12) (60,40,27,21,12) (60,40,27,21,12)* (60,40,27,21,12) (60,40,27,21,12)*
(1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0) (60,50,35,21,12) (60,50,35,21,12) (60,70,55,36,12) (60,40,30,21,12)* (60,30,25,21,12)*
(1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) (60,55,40,24,12) (60,55,40,24,12) (60,40,30,24,12)* (60,45,35,24,12) (60,45,35,24,12)*
(1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (60,57,39,24,12) (60,42,34,24,12) (60,42,34,24,12)* (60,42,34,24,12)* (60,57,39,24,12)
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0) (60,60,39,24,12) (60,60,39,24,12) (60,40,34,24,12) (60,40,34,24,12)* (60,40,34,24,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0) (60,75,57,36,12) (60,45,32,21,12) (60,45,32,21,12) (60,45,32,21,12)* (60,30,27,21,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0) (60,60,42,24,12) (60,50,37,24,12) (60,50,37,24,12) (60,40,32,24,12)* (60,40,32,24,12)*
(1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1) (60,47,34,24,12)* (60,47,34,24,12) (60,52,39,24,12) (60,52,39,24,12) (60,42,34,24,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0) (60,55,39,24,12) (60,55,39,24,12) (60,45,34,24,12) (60,45,34,24,12)* (60,40,34,24,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1) (60,52,36,24,12) (60,47,36,24,12) (60,47,36,24,12)* (60,47,36,24,12)* (60,47,36,24,12)
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0) (60,50,36,24,12) (60,50,36,24,12) (60,50,36,24,12) (60,45,36,24,12)* (60,45,36,24,12)*
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12) (60,48,36,24,12)
Table 3: Payos in communication situations with symmetric 5-person games.






for all C 2 N=L: (5)
By component eÆciency of the Myerson value it follows that there exists i 2 C1 and
j 2 C2 with i(N; v; L) 
v(C1)
jC1j
and j(N; v; L) 
v(C2)
jC2j
. Combining this with (4) and
(5) we nd that i(N; v; L)  i(N; v; L
N) and j(N; v; L)  j(N; v; L
N).
Secondly, assume that jN=Lj = 1. Then depending on whether jN j = 3, jN j = 4, or
jN j = 5, a pair of players satisfying the required condition can be found, indicated by
stars, in tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
This completes the proof. 2
Two structures are called payo equivalent if they result in the same payos to the
players. The following theorem states that in symmetric and strictly convex games
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with at most 5 players only structures can result that are payo equivalent to the full
cooperation structure.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N; v) be a game that is symmetric and strictly convex with at least
2 and at most 5 players. For any order  it holds that if (N;L) 2 PEG(N; v; ; ) then
(N;L) is payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure.
Proof: The theorem is obviously true if jN j = 2. From now on, assume that jN j  3. It
follows similar to the proof of theorem 4.1 that the conditions of lemma 3.2 rather than
lemma 3.1 are satised, with L the set consisting of the graphs that are payo equivalent
to the complete graph. This completes the proof. 2
Consider a symmetric strictly convex game with at most 5 players. Then the set of
graphs that are payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure consists of the full
cooperation structure itself and the graphs with a set of links that together form a cycle
that traverses all points in the graph. Such a graph is usually called a wheel.
5 A 6-person symmetric convex game
This section is devoted entirely to the analysis of a specic 6-person symmetric convex
game. The analysis of this game shows that we cannot extend the results of the previous
section to games with more than 5 players in a straightforward manner. We will analyze
the link formation games with this convex game as its underlying game and with all
possible orders of the pairs of players. We will show that according to the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium concept a graph can result in which the players' payos are
dierent from those in the full cooperation structure.
For notational convenience, in this section, we will sometimes denote an order  by
(l1; l2; : : : ; lk), meaning that for all r 2 f1; : : : ; kg it holds that link lr is in position r
according to , i.e., (lr) = r. Furthermore, we will sometimes refer to a link fi; jg by
ij.
The game that is the main subject of study in this section is introduced in the following
example.
Example 5.1 Let (N; v) be the 6-person symmetric convex game with player set N =
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0 if jT j  1;
60 if jT j = 2;
180 if jT j = 3;
360 if jT j = 4;
600 if jT j = 5;
1800 if T = N:
(6)




ufi;jg + 900uN :
Though the game (N;w) with w = 1
60
v has similar characteristics, we have chosen to
analyze (N; v) to avoid non-integer payos to the players. Wilson and Watkins (1990)
state that there exist 156 non-isomorphic graphs with 6 players (vertices). An overview of
the payos to the players in communication situations (N; v; L), with (N; v) as described
above and (N;L) any of the 156 non-isomorphic graphs, can be found in the appendix.
We will refer to the graph with number i in the appendix by (N;Li). Two of these

































































a: (N;L156) b: (N;L146)
Figure 1: Graphs (N;L156) and (N;L146).
Graph (N;L156) is the complete graph and graph (N;L146) is the graph with all
links except f1; 6g, f2; 6g, f3; 5g, and f4; 5g. The payos the players receive in the
communication situations associated with these graphs are
(N; v; L156) = (300; 300; 300; 300; 300; 300)
and
(N; v; L146) = (301; 301; 301; 301; 298; 298);
which can be found in the appendix.
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In graph (N;L146) players 5 and 6 are the only players who are worse o than they
are in the complete cooperation structure (N;L156). Additionally, players 5 and 6 are
connected with each other in (N;L146). Hence, we cannot apply lemma 3.1 in an attempt
to prove that the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. 3
Example 5.1 implies that the conditions of lemma 3.1 are not always satised for
6-person symmetric convex games. This example is in line with an unpublished example
of R. Holzman, who analyzed a non-symmetric 5-person convex game that does not
satisfy the conditions of lemma 3.1. By example 5.1 it follows that it is not possible
to prove a generalization of theorem 4.2 to more than 5 players along the lines of the
proof of theorem 4.2. However, example 5.1 does not imply that theorem 4.2 cannot be
generalized to symmetric convex games with more than 5 players. This demands for a
more extensive analysis of the game in example 5.1.
Example 5.2 Consider the game (N; v) of example 5.1. Furthermore, let L be the set
of graphs that are payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure or isomorphic to
(N;L146). Then, referring to the payos in the appendix, it follows that L is the set of
graphs that are isomorphic to one of following graphs: (N;L156), (N;L152), (N;L146),
(N;L123), (N;L122), or (N;L54). Graphs (N;L156) and (N;L146) were already represented
in gure 1. The other four graphs can be found in gure 2.
We remark that though we consider a class of graphs with 6 non-isomorphic graphs
only, many graphs belong this class. For example there exist 90 graphs that are, up to
isomorphisms, the same as graph (N;L146). This class of graphs will play an important
role in the remainder of this section. 3
We will study to what extent we can narrow down the set of graphs that can form
according to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this example. We will use the following
lemma, which states that for any subgame that starts right after a link has been formed
and for the game in extensive form itself, it holds that according to the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium concept a graph payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure or
isomorphic to (N;L146) will result.
Lemma 5.1 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6), let L be the set of graphs
that are payo equivalent to (N;LN) or isomorphic to (N;L146), let L  LN , and let 
be any order of the links in LNnL. Then PEG(N; v; ; ; L)  L.
Proof: By the appendix it follows that for almost all (N;L) with L  LN and (N;L) 62 L
























































































c: (N;L122) d: (N;L54)
Figure 2: Graphs (N;L152), (N;L123), (N;L122), and (N;L54).
298. In fact, this holds for all graphs outside L except for the graphs isomorphic to one
of the graphs indexed 151, 154, and 155. For none of these graphs it holds that the set
of links of those graphs is a subset of L146 or of a graph isomorphic to L146. For the
graphs indexed 151, 154, and 155 there exists a pair of players i; j 2 N with fi; jg 62 L,
i(N; v; L) < 300, and j(N; v; L) < 300. Now, lemma 3.3 completes the proof. 2
We will introduce some additional notation. Note that in any graph isomorphic to
(N;L146) two players are exploited by the others, i.e., they receive 298 only, whereas
they would receive 300 in the full cooperation structure. Furthermore, note that any
exploited player is connected with two not-exploited players besides the other exploited
player. Denote the graph isomorphic to (N;L146) with players i and j exploited and
player i additionally connected to players r and t by Gi;jr;t. Furthermore, let G
i;j =
fGi;jr;t j r; t 2 Nnfi; jgg be the set of graphs isomorphic to (N;L
146) with players i and j
exploited. We remark that Gi;j = Gj;i.
The following lemma will be used in the remainder of this section and deals with the
stability of graphs isomorphic to graph (N;L146).
Lemma 5.2 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6) and let i; j; r; t 2 N all
be distinct. Then Gi;jr;t is superstable with respect to (N; v) and .
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that i = 5, j = 6, r = 1, and t = 2.
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Consider lf (N; v; ; ;G5;61;2) with  an arbitrary order of the links f16; 26; 35; 45g.
By lemma 5.1 it follows that once a link is formed in lf(N; v; ; ;G5;61;2) the players will
end up in the full cooperation structure. In all links that have not been formed yet a
player (1, 2, 3, or 4) is involved who receives strictly more in the current structure, i.e.,
G5;61;2, than in the full cooperation structure, namely 301 versus 300. Hence, this player
strictly prefers the current structure to the full cooperation structure. By subgame
perfectness we conclude rst that the last pair in the order refuses if all other pairs have
refused to form a link. Then, by backward induction, it follows that all other pairs
will actually refuse to form a link as well. We conclude that no link will be formed in
lf (N; v; ; ;G5;61;2) and, hence, G
5;6
1;2 is superstable. 2
We can now prove the rst main theorem of this section. This theorem states that for
the link formation game associated with (N; v) of example 5.1 there exists an order of
all pairs of players such that according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept
a graph isomorphic to (N;L146) can result.
Theorem 5.1 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6) and let i; j; r; t 2 N all
be distinct. Then there exists an order  of all pairs of players such that
Gi;jr;t 2 PEG(N; v; ; ):
Proof: Without loss of generality let i = 5, j = 6, r = 1, and t = 2. Then
G5;61;2 =
n




LNnG5;61;2 = f16; 26; 35; 45g : (8)
We remark that G5;61;2 is represented in gure 1 (b). For notational convenience we denote
the links in G5;61;2 by l1 = 56, l2 = 12, . . . , l10 = 25, and l11 = 46, following the order in
which the links were denoted in (7). Furthermore, we dene 0 = ; and
k = fl1; : : : ; lkg
for all k 2 f1; 2 : : : ; 11g. Note that 11 = G
5;6
1;2. We will show by backward induction
that G5;61;2 = 11 results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game
lf (N; v; ; ) for the order of the links  = (16; 26; 35; 45; l11; : : : ; l1).
Dene k = (16; 26; 35; 45; l11; : : : ; lk+1) for all k 2 f0; : : : ; 10g and 11 =
(16; 26; 35; 45). Note that 0 = . We will show that G
5;6
1;2 results according to a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in lf (N; v; ; k;k) for all k 2 f0; : : : ; 11g. The proof will be
by induction to 11  k.
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Firstly, let 11  k = 0. Consider lf(N; v; ; 11;11) = 
lf (N; v; ; 11; G
5;6
1;2). Recall
that 11 = (16; 26; 35; 45), i.e., link 16 is rst according to 11. By lemma 5.2 it follows
that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in G5;61;2.
Secondly, let k 2 f0; : : : ; 10g and suppose that G5;61;2 results according to a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in the game lf (N; v; ; k+1;k+1).
Consider lf(N; v; ; k;k). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s is described as
follows. Firstly, we describe s in the subgames that start right after the formation of any
additional link in lf (N; v; ; k;k). For the subgame following the formation of lk+1
let s prescribe a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in G5;61;2, which is possible
by the induction hypothesis. For the subgames following the formation of any l 6= lk+1
x any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this subgame.
It remains to describe for all l 2 LNnk the choice according to s in the decision node
where link l has to make a decision and no links have been formed so far, i.e., the root
of lf (N; v; ; k;k; k(l)   1). Let l 2 LNnk. Now, s prescribes that l is formed if
l = lk+1 and l is not formed if l 6= lk+1.
It remains to show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By construc-
tion it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all subgames following the formation
of any link. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a decision and no
links have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; k;k; k(l)   1). We will
distinguish between two cases.
Firstly, suppose l = lk+1. By the payos in table 4 it follows that the players in
lk+1 receive strictly less according to k than they would receive according to G
5;6
1;2. So,
both players prefer to form link lk+1, which implies that the choice of l according to s is
subgame perfect.
Secondly, suppose l precedes lk+1 according to k, not necessarily directly. If l deviates
from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming it, then both players in l will, according
to lemma 5.1 receive at most 301, whereas at least one of them receives at least 301
according to G5;61;2, which forms according to s. So, this player weakly prefers not to form
l and, hence, the choice of this link according to s is subgame perfect.
We conclude that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consequently, G5;61;2
results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game lf(N; v; ; k;k).
Since lf(N; v; ; 0;0) = 
lf(N; v; ; ) there exists a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium in lf (N; v; ; ) that results in G5;61;2. 2
Before we can prove the following theorem we need some additional notation. For all
G  LN denote by W (G) the set of links that have not been formed yet in which both
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graph isomorphic to 1 2 3 4 5 6 link
0 L
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 l1 = 56
1 L
2 0 0 0 0 30 30 l2 = 12
2 L
4 30 30 0 0 30 30 l3 = 13
3 L
8 80 50 50 0 30 30 l4 = 14
4 L
13 150 70 70 70 30 30 l5 = 23
5 L
25 130 80 80 70 30 30 l6 = 24
6 L
42 95 85 85 85 30 30 l7 = 34
7 L
68 90 90 90 90 30 30 l8 = 15
8 L
88 395 275 275 275 335 245 l9 = 36
9 L
113 322 286 322 286 292 292 l10 = 25
10 L
133 301 301 314 290 307 287 l11 = 46
11 L
146 301 301 301 301 298 298 -
Table 4: Payos in k for all k 2 f0; : : : ; 11g.
players receive strictly less than 301, i.e,
W (G) = fl 2 LNnG j a(N; v;G) < 301 for all a 2 lg: (9)
Furthermore, for all i; j 2 N with i 6= j denote the graph with link fi; jg and all links
between the remaining players, by F i;j, i.e.,
F i;j = fi; jg [ LNnfi;jg:





















Figure 3: Graph (N;F 5;6), which coincides with (N;L68).
In table 5 an overview of all non-isomorphic graphs G with F 5;6  G  H for some
H 2 G5;6 can be found, with associated W (G). Using this table it can be checked that
for all G with F 5;6  G  H for some H 2 G5;6 and any l in W (G) it holds that
F 5;6  G [ flg  H 0 for some H 0 2 G5;6.
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G [ flg,
G W (G) l 2 W (G),
is isomorphic to
(N;L68) f15; 16; 25; 26; 35; 36; 45; 46g (N;L88)
(N;L88) f26; 36; 46g (N;L113)
(N;L111) f36; 46g (N;L133)
(N;L113) f25; 26; 45; 46g (N;L133)
(N;L133) f46g (N;L146)
(N;L146) ; -
Table 5: All non-isomorphic graphs G with F 5;6  G  H for some H 2 G5;6.
Using table 5 we can prove the following theorem, which states that once a graph F i;j
has been formed, then with certainty players i and j will be exploited according to any
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6) and let i; j 2 N with
i 6= j. For all graphs G with F i;j  G  H for some H 2 Gi;j and every order  of the
links in LNnG it holds that
PEG(N; v; ; ;G)  Gi;j:
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that i = 5 and j = 6. The proof will be by
induction to 11  jGj.
Firstly, let G be a graph with 11 jGj = 0, such that F 5;6  G  H for some H 2 G5;6
and let  be any order of the links in LNnG. Then clearly G 2 G5;6. By lemma 5.2 it
follows that PEG(N; v; ; ;G)  G5;6.
Secondly, let k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g and assume that for all graphs G with 11  jGj = k and
F 5;6  G  H for some H 2 G5;6 and any order  of the links in LNnG it holds that
PEG(N; v; ; ;G)  G5;6.
Let G be a graph with 11   jGj = k + 1 and F 5;6  G  H for some H 2 G5;6 and
let  be an order of the links in LNnG. Let s be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
lf (N; v; ; ;G). We will show that s results in a structure in G5;6. In order to prove
this we dene
A = fl 2 LNnG j G [ flg  H for some H 2 G5;6g;
B = fl 2 LNnG j l 62 Ag:
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By the induction hypothesis we infer that s induces the formation of a structure in G5;6
in every subgame that follows after the formation of a link in A. Moreover, s induces
the formation of LN in every subgame that follows after the formation of a link in B.
This follows by lemma 5.1 and since LN is the unique graph in L that contains all links
of G and an arbitrary link of B.
In order to prove that s induces a structure in G5;6 in lf (N; v; ; ;G) we distinguish
between two cases: (i) there exists an l 2 A such that s prescribes that l is formed (rst)
in lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1) and (ii) for all l 2 A it holds that s prescribes that l is not
formed (rst) in lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1).
Case (i): There exists an l 2 A such that s prescribes that l is formed (rst) in
lf (N; v; ; ;G; (l)   1). Suppose s does not result in a structure in G5;6. Then by
lemma 5.1 it follows that s results in LN . Hence, there exists a link l0 2 B that precedes
l according to  and l0 chooses to form according to s in lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l0)   1).
This would imply that both players in l0 weakly prefer LN to a structure in G5;6. This
cannot be true since l0 contains at least one of the players in f1; 2; 3; 4g who all receive
301 according to any H 2 G5;6.
Case (ii): For all l 2 A it holds that s prescribes that l is not formed (rst) in
subgame lf (N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1). By lemma 5.1 we conclude that s induces structure
LN . Therefore, there exists l 2 B such that both players in l weakly prefer LN to G.
Stated dierently, there exists a link l 2 LNnG such that G[flg 6 H for every H 2 G5;6
and a(N; v;G)  a(N; v; LN) = 300 for both a 2 l. This implies l 2 W (G). According
to table 5 we get G [ flg  H for some H 2 G5;6. A contradiction.
This completes the proof. 2
The following lemma is related to theorem 5.2, which implies that once a graph F i;j
has been formed, a graph in Gi;j will be reached according to a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. The following lemma shows that if the link fi; jg has been formed and
only links have been formed that belong to F i;j, then Gi;j can be reached by a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.3 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6) and let i; j 2 N with
i 6= j. For all graphs G with ffi; jgg  G  F i;j and any order  of the links in LNnG
it holds that Gi;j \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that i = 5 and j = 6. The proof will be by
induction to 7  jGj.
Firstly, let G be a graph with 7   jGj = 0 and ff5; 6gg  G  F 5;6, i.e., G =
F 5;6, and let  be any order of the links in LNnG. By theorem 5.2 it follows that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) = PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
23
Secondly, let k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and assume that for all graphs G with 7   jGj = k
and ff5; 6gg  G  F 5;6 and any order  of the links in LNnG it holds that G5;6 \
PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
Let G be a graph with 7   jGj = k + 1 and ff5; 6gg  G  F 5;6 and let  be
an order of the links in LNnG. Let fa; bg be the link that is last according to  with
fa; bg  f1; 2; 3; 4g. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s is described as follows.
Firstly, we describe s in the subgames that start right after the formation of any
additional link in lf (N; v; ; ;G). For the subgame following the formation of fa; bg
let s prescribe a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in G 2 G5;6, which is
possible by the induction hypothesis, since G[fa; bg  F 5;6. For any subgame following
the formation of an l 6= fa; bg, x any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this subgame.
It remains to describe for all l 2 LNnG the choice according to s in the decision node
where link l has to make a decision and no links have been formed so far, i.e., the root
of lf (N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1). Now, s prescribes that l is formed if l = fa; bg, l chooses
subgame perfect if l is preceded by fa; bg according to , and l is not formed if l precedes
fa; bg according to .
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By construction
it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all subgames following the formation of
any link. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a decision and no links
have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1). We will distinguish
between three cases.
Firstly, suppose l is preceded by fa; bg according to . Then the choice of l is subgame
perfect by construction.
Secondly, suppose l = fa; bg. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming fa; bg
rather than forming it. Then G results or l precedes a link according to  that will be
formed, in which case it follows by lemma 5.1 that a structure payo equivalent to the
full cooperation structure or isomorphic to (N;L146) will result. In all cases the deviation
does not strictly improve the payos of a or b since they will receive 301 if they play
according to s. The fact that they both receive less according to G follows from the
payos in the appendix. We conclude that players a and b weakly prefer to form the link
and, hence, the choice of fa; bg according to s is subgame perfect.
Finally, suppose l precedes fa; bg according to , not necessarily directly. If l deviates
from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming it, then both players in l will, according
to lemma 5.1 receive at most 301, whereas at least one of them receives 301 according
to any H 2 G5;6, one of which is formed according to s. This player weakly prefers not
to form l. Hence, the choice of l according to s is subgame perfect.
Consequently, s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium implying that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;:
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This completes the proof. 2
In the following lemma we consider a situation in which one link has been formed and
the link that is last according to the order of the links that have not been formed yet
has no player in common with the formed link. The lemma states that the players in the
link that is last in the order can be exploited in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.4 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6). Let i; j; k; l 2 N all be
distinct. Let G = ffk; lgg and let  be an order of the links in LNnG with fi; jg last.
Then it holds that Gi;j \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that i = 5, j = 6, k = 3, and l = 4. Then
G = ff3; 4gg has already been formed and f5; 6g is last according to .
Consider lf (N; v; ; ;G). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s is described as
follows. Let l 2 LNnff3; 4gg. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a
decision and no links have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l) 1).
Now, s prescribes that l is formed if l = f5; 6g and l is not formed if l 6= f5; 6g. It remains
to describe s in the subgames that start right after the formation of any additional link.
For the subgame following the formation of f5; 6g let s prescribe a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium that results in the formation of a specic G 2 G5;6, which is possible
by lemma 5.3 since ff5; 6gg  ff3; 4g; f5; 6gg  F 5;6. For the subgames following the
formation of any l 6= f5; 6g x any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this subgame.
It remains to show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By construc-
tion it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all subgames following the formation
of any link. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a decision and no links
have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; ;G; (l)  1). We will distinguish
between two cases.
Firstly, suppose l precedes f5; 6g according to , i.e., l is not last according to .
If l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming it, then both players in
l will, according to lemma 5.1, receive at most 301. Since l 6= f5; 6g it follows that
l \ f1; 2; 3; 4g 6= ; and, hence, at least one of the players in l receives 301 according
to G. So, this player weakly prefers not to form the link and, hence, the choice of l
according to s is subgame perfect.
Secondly, suppose l = f5; 6g. If l deviates from s, i.e., not forming f5; 6g rather than
forming it, then, graph G = ff3; 4gg will result, since f5; 6g is last according to . This
deviation, hence, decreases the payos of both players. So, both players 5 and 6 prefer
to form link l and, hence, the choice of f5; 6g according to s is subgame perfect.
Consequently, s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, implying that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;:
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This completes the proof. 2
The following lemma deals with a situation where two links have been formed already
and there is a player who is involved in both links. The lemma implies that the player
involved in both links, combined with any of the players he is connected with, can be
exploited in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.5 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6). Let i; j; k 2 N all be
distinct and let G = ffi; jg; fj; kgg. For any order  of the links in LNnG it holds that
Gi;j \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that i = 5, j = 6, and k = 4, i.e., G =
ff4; 6g; f5; 6gg. Dene l3 = 14, l4 = 34, l5 = 24, l6 = 12, l7 = 13, and l8 = 23.
Furthermore, dene 2 = G and k = f46; 56; l3; : : : ; lkg for all k 2 f3; : : : ; 8g. Note
that 8 satises F
5;6  8  G
5;6
1;2. We will now prove that for all k 2 f2; : : : ; 8g and any
order  of the links in LNnk it holds that G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;k) 6= ;. The proof
will be by induction to 8  k.
Firstly, let 8 k = 0, i.e., consider 8. Let  be an order of the links in LNn8. Since
8 satises F
5;6  8  G
5;6
1;2 it follows by theorem 5.2 thatG
5;6\PEG(N; v; ; ;8) 6= ;.
Secondly, let k 2 f3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g and assume that for graph k and any order  of the
links in LNnk it holds that G
5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;k) 6= ;.
Consider lf (N; v; ; ;k 1). Construct a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s sim-
ilar to the strategy prole in the proof of lemma 5.3 except that the role of fa; bg is
played by lk. Note that k = k 1 [ flkg. By table 6 it follows that both players in lk
prefer any H 2 G5;6 to structure k 1.
graph isomorphic to 1 2 3 4 5 6 link
2 L
3 0 0 0 50 50 80 l3 = 14
3 L
7 65 0 0 115 65 115 l4 = 34
4 L
12 85 0 85 200 80 150 l5 = 24
5 L
21 255 255 255 455 245 335 l6 = 12
6 L
38 265 265 255 435 245 335 l7 = 13
7 L
62 280 270 270 400 245 335 l8 = 23
8 L
88 275 275 275 395 245 335 -
Table 6: Payos in k for all k 2 f2; : : : ; 8g.
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Now, it follows similar to the proof of lemma 5.3 that s is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, implying that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ;k 1) 6= ;:
This completes the proof. 2
Note that the proof provides a path of graphs such that if we consider the link for-
mation game starting with this graph then a graph with two specic players exploited
can result according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The following lemma states that if one link has been formed and this link has one
player in common with the pair of players that is last according to the order that results
right after the formation of the link, then the pair of players that is last according to
the order that results can be exploited according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this lemma has been omitted since it follows similar to the proof of lemma
5.4 using lemma 5.5 rather than lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.6 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6). Let i; j; k 2 N all be
distinct. Let G = ffj; kgg and let  be an order of the links in LNnG with fi; jg last.
Then it holds that Gi;j \ PEG(N; v; ; ;G) 6= ;.
Using the lemmas above we can prove the last theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.3 Let (N; v) be the 6-person game described by (6). Let  be any order of
the links in LN . For all i; j 2 N with i 6= j it holds that Gi;j \ PEG(N; v; ; ) 6= ;.
Proof: Let i; j 2 N with i 6= j. Without loss of generality assume that i = 5 and j = 6.
We will distinguish between two cases: (i) f5; 6g is last according to  and (ii) f5; 6g is
not last according to .
Case (i): f5; 6g is last according to . A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s is
described as follows. Let l 2 LN . Consider the decision node where link l has to make a
decision and no links have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf (N; v; ; ; ;; (l)  1).
Now, s prescribes that l is formed if l = f5; 6g and l is not formed if l 6= f5; 6g. It remains
to describe s in the subgames that start right after the formation of any additional link.
For the subgame following the formation of f5; 6g let s prescribe a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium that results in a specic G 2 G5;6, which is possible by lemma 5.3.
For the subgames following the formation of any l 6= f5; 6g x any subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in this subgame.
It remains to show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By construc-
tion it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all subgames following the formation
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of any link. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a decision and no links
have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; ; ;; (l)  1). We will distinguish
between two cases.
Firstly, suppose l 6= f5; 6g. If l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not
forming it, then both players in l will, according to lemma 5.1, receive at most 301.
Since l 6= f5; 6g it follows that l \ f1; 2; 3; 4g 6= ; and, hence, at least one of the players
in l receives 301 according to G. So, this player weakly prefers not to form link l, which
implies that the choice of l according to s is subgame perfect.
Secondly, suppose l = f5; 6g. If l deviates from s, i.e., not forming f5; 6g rather than
forming it, then the empty graph will result. This deviation, hence, decreases the payos
of both players. So, both players 5 and 6 prefer to form link l and, hence, the choice of
f5; 6g according to s is subgame perfect.
Consequently, s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, implying that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ) 6= ;:
Case (ii): f5; 6g is not last according to . A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s is
described as follows. Let l 2 LN . Consider the decision node where link l has to make a
decision and no links have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf (N; v; ; ; ;; (l)  1).
Now, s prescribes that l is formed if l is preceded by f5; 6g according to  or l = f5; 6g,
and l is not formed if l precedes f5; 6g. It remains to describe s in the subgames that
start right after the formation of any additional link. For the subgame following the
formation of a link l that was preceded by f5; 6g according to  let s prescribe a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium that results in H 2 Ga;b, where a; b are such that fa; bg directly
precedes l according to , i.e., (fa; bg) = (l)  1. This is possible by lemmas 5.4 and
5.6. For the subgame following the formation of f5; 6g let s prescribe a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium that results in a specic G 2 G5;6, which is possible by lemma 5.3.
For the subgames following the formation of any l that precedes f5; 6g according to 
x any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this subgame.
It remains to show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By construc-
tion it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for all subgames following the formation
of any link. Consider the decision node where link l has to make a decision and no links
have been formed so far, i.e., the root of lf(N; v; ; ; ;; (l)  1). We will distinguish
between three cases.
Firstly, suppose l is preceded by f5; 6g according to . Suppose l deviates from s, i.e.,
not forming l rather than forming it. If l is last according to  then after the deviation
the empty graph will result, decreasing the payos of both players in l. If l is not last
according to  then the link that follows l according to  will be formed. In the subgame
following the formation of this link it follows that after the deviation, both players in l
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will receive 298. This deviation does not strictly improve the payo of any of the players
in l, since originally they would both receive at least 298. In both cases at least one of
the players in l weakly prefers not to form l and, hence, the choice of l according to s is
subgame perfect.
Secondly, suppose l = f5; 6g. Similar to the analysis for the links that are preceded
by f5; 6g it follows that a deviation of f5; 6g results in both players 5 and 6 receiving
298. These payos coincide with the payos players 5 and 6 receive originally. So, both
players 5 and 6 weakly prefer to form link f5; 6g and, hence, the choice of f5; 6g according
to s is subgame perfect.
Thirdly, suppose l precedes f5; 6g according to . If l deviates from s, i.e., forming
l rather than not forming it, then both players in l will, according to lemma 5.1 receive
at most 301. Since l 6= f5; 6g it follows that l \ f1; 2; 3; 4g 6= ; and, hence, at least one
of the players in l receives 301 according to G. This player weakly prefers not to form
l and, hence, the choice of this link according to s is subgame perfect.
Consequently, s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, implying that
G5;6 \ PEG(N; v; ; ) 6= ;:
This completes the proof. 2
Theorem 5.3 provides a result for any initial order of the links. Hence, one might
suspect that starting with an arbitrary set of links, the resulting set of graphs or payos
are independent of the order of the links. An analysis that deals with this issue and
that seems promising at rst sight is to determine for the link formation games starting
with each of the 156 non-isomorphic graphs and some order of the links that have not
been formed whether a structure payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure or
isomorphic to (N;L146) will result. Working our way back, starting with graph (N;L156)
this works well for graphs with at least 10 links. The rst problems arise in graphs
isomorphic to (N;L110). These problems are illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.3 Consider graph (N;L110), which is represented in gure 4. Only one
structure isomorphic to (N;L146) contains all links of graph (N;L110), namely G5;61;2.
Additionally, it contains links 46 and 56. In communication situation (N; v; L110), where
v is the characteristic function of example 5.1, the payos the players receive according
to the Myerson value equal
(N; v; L110) = (303; 303; 373; 285; 278; 258):
Obviously, there are player-specic preferences over the structures. Part of these pref-







































Figure 4: Graph (N;L110).
are displayed in table 7.2
players part of preference over structures
1,2,3 (N;L110)  G5;61;2  (N;L
156)
4 G5;61;2  (N;L
156)  (N;L110)
5,6 (N;L156)  G5;61;2  (N;L
110)
Table 7: Part of preferences of the players
Consider a link formation game in extensive form starting with initial set of links L110
and some order of the missing links. We will analyze the structures that result according
to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a rather informal way. If possible, players 1, 2,
and 3 would like to avoid the formation of an additional link. Hence, the only links that
are relevant in the analysis are links 45, 46, and 56. It can be checked that if one of links
46 and 56 forms rst the players end up in structure G5;61;2. If any of the other links, i.e.,
link 45 or one of the links in which some of players 1, 2, and 3 are involved, forms rst,
then the full cooperation structure (N;L156) will result.
We will argue that the order of links 45, 46, and 56 determines the cooperation
structure that results. First, suppose 45 is last of those three links. Consider the decisions
of the links if no links have been formed so far according to any subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. The links that are after 45 according to the order will, if all links before
them refuse to form, choose not to form as well, since at least one of players 1, 2, and
3 is involved in any of these links and this player prefers (N;L110) to (N;L156). Link 45
will form since both players in this link prefer (N;L156) to (N;L110). Finally, suppose a
link before 45 according to the order chooses form and a structure dierent from the full
cooperation structure results. Obviously, this other structure is G5;61;2 and the link under
2By a  b we denote a player prefers a to b.
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consideration has to be one of the links 46 and 56. Since player 6 prefers (N;L156) to G5;61;2
this decision of this link cannot be subgame perfect. We conclude that each subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium results in full cooperation structure (N;L156).
Secondly, with a similar analysis, we conclude that if 46 or 56 is last according to
the order of the links 45, 46, and 56 then G5;61;2 results according to any subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
The dependence on the order of the links makes it hard to continue to identify the
structures that result starting with graphs that are contained in a graph isomorphic to
(N;L110). 3
This section has been devoted completely to the analysis of a 6-person symmetric
convex game, the game described by (6). More specically, we analyzed the associated
link formation games in extensive form. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis. First, cf. theorem 5.2, once a 4-person coalition and a 2-person coalition have
been formed, i.e., the full cooperation structure within those coalitions and no other links
have been formed, then the players in the 2-person coalition will eventually be exploited.
Secondly, cf. theorem 5.3, starting with no links formed, any order of the links can
result in any pair of players being exploited. However, it is still unknown whether all
subgame perfect Nash equilibria result in two players being exploited. Stated dierently,
the question
\Does a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in a structure payo
equivalent to the full cooperation structure exist?"
remains unanswered.
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Appendix: Non-isomorphic graphs with 6 players
This appendix deals with payos in communication situations with (N; v) of example
5.1 as the underlying game. Tables 8 through 13 provide an overview of these payos
for all 156 non-isomorphic graphs with 6 players according to the Myerson value. Recall
the binary representation of a graph from section 4.
number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
2 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (30, 30, 0, 0, 0, 0)
3 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (80, 50, 50, 0, 0, 0)
4 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (30, 30, 30, 30, 0, 0)
5 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (150, 70, 70, 70, 0, 0)
6 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (60, 60, 60, 0, 0, 0)
7 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (115, 115, 65, 65, 0, 0)
8 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (80, 50, 50, 30, 30, 0)
9 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30)
10 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (240, 90, 90, 90, 90, 0)
11 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (130, 80, 80, 70, 0, 0)
Table 8: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 1.
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number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
12 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (200, 150, 85, 85, 80, 0)
13 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (150, 70, 70, 70, 30, 30)
14 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (60, 60, 60, 30, 30, 0)
15 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (90, 90, 90, 90, 0, 0)
16 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (162, 142, 142, 77, 77, 0)
17 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (115, 115, 65, 65, 30, 30)
18 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (80, 50, 50, 80, 50, 50)
19 (1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (500, 260, 260, 260, 260, 260)
20 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (220, 100, 100, 90, 90, 0)
21 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (455, 335, 255, 255, 255, 245)
22 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (95, 95, 85, 85, 0, 0)
23 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (165, 165, 100, 85, 85, 0)
24 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (180, 95, 95, 150, 80, 0)
25 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (130, 80, 80, 70, 30, 30)
26 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (400, 400, 250, 250, 250, 250)
27 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (178, 113, 113, 88, 108, 0)
28 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (412, 327, 327, 250, 242, 242)
29 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (389, 359, 247, 247, 319, 239)
30 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (60, 60, 60, 80, 50, 50)
31 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (90, 90, 90, 90, 30, 30)
32 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (120, 120, 120, 120, 120, 0)
33 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (349, 349, 314, 314, 237, 237)
34 (1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (480, 270, 270, 260, 260, 260)
35 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (185, 115, 105, 105, 90, 0)
36 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (420, 350, 270, 255, 255, 250)
37 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (200, 100, 100, 100, 100, 0)
38 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0) (435, 265, 265, 335, 255, 245)
39 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0) (436, 286, 286, 258, 258, 276)
40 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (90, 90, 90, 90, 0, 0)
Table 9: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 2.
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number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
41 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (118, 118, 173, 103, 88, 0)
42 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (95, 95, 85, 85, 30, 30)
43 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (350, 350, 350, 250, 250, 250)
44 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (131, 131, 106, 116, 116, 0)
45 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0) (377, 342, 265, 327, 247, 242)
46 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (380, 260, 260, 400, 250, 250)
47 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) (369, 257, 257, 359, 319, 239)
48 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0) (366, 366, 281, 253, 281, 253)
49 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (132, 112, 112, 112, 132, 0)
50 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (392, 280, 280, 332, 272, 244)
51 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1) (360, 288, 288, 252, 360, 252)
52 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) (374, 297, 297, 254, 289, 289)
53 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60)
54 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
55 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (445, 285, 275, 275, 260, 260)
56 (1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (460, 270, 270, 270, 270, 260)
57 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (135, 135, 110, 110, 110, 0)
58 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (370, 370, 275, 275, 255, 255)
59 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (180, 110, 110, 110, 90, 0)
60 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (138, 123, 123, 108, 108, 0)
61 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (373, 288, 358, 273, 255, 253)
62 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (400, 280, 270, 270, 335, 245)
63 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0) (431, 291, 291, 258, 258, 271)
64 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0) (400, 350, 270, 265, 265, 250)
65 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) (389, 304, 276, 289, 258, 284)
66 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1) (416, 268, 268, 286, 286, 276)
67 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) (391, 283, 283, 283, 259, 301)
68 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (90, 90, 90, 90, 30, 30)
69 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (117, 117, 127, 127, 112, 0)
Table 10: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 3.
34
number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
70 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (293, 293, 355, 355, 252, 252)
71 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1) (285, 285, 387, 267, 332, 244)
72 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0) (308, 308, 360, 285, 285, 254)
73 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (309, 301, 273, 371, 291, 255)
74 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1) (317, 317, 274, 299, 299, 294)
75 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (380, 260, 260, 380, 260, 260)
76 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0) (368, 308, 308, 256, 280, 280)
77 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0) (324, 324, 288, 288, 288, 288)
78 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (321, 286, 286, 293, 321, 293)
79 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (395, 305, 280, 280, 280, 260)
80 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (440, 280, 280, 280, 260, 260)
81 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (398, 293, 293, 278, 278, 260)
82 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (425, 285, 275, 275, 270, 270)
83 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (130, 130, 115, 115, 110, 0)
84 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (311, 311, 366, 278, 278, 256)
85 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0) (365, 365, 280, 280, 255, 255)
86 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0) (311, 381, 296, 278, 276, 258)
87 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1) (327, 327, 281, 281, 292, 292)
88 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (395, 275, 275, 275, 335, 245)
89 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (124, 119, 119, 119, 119, 0)
90 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (316, 298, 293, 363, 275, 255)
91 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (375, 287, 300, 300, 258, 280)
92 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) (332, 296, 314, 278, 291, 289)
93 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0) (411, 291, 291, 268, 268, 271)
94 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) (386, 288, 288, 283, 259, 296)
95 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0) (332, 309, 278, 309, 278, 294)
96 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1) (332, 304, 280, 286, 286, 312)
97 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1) (328, 286, 286, 286, 286, 328)
98 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1) (285, 285, 303, 303, 368, 256)
Table 11: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 4.
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number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
99 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (291, 291, 316, 316, 293, 293)
100 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) (298, 305, 305, 318, 287, 287)
101 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (312, 312, 276, 312, 312, 276)
102 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0) (308, 308, 308, 284, 308, 284)
103 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (330, 330, 285, 285, 285, 285)
104 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (390, 300, 285, 285, 280, 260)
105 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (336, 316, 301, 283, 283, 281)
106 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (420, 280, 280, 280, 270, 270)
107 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (384, 289, 289, 289, 289, 260)
108 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (341, 303, 298, 298, 280, 280)
109 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) (122, 122, 122, 117, 117, 0)
110 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0) (303, 303, 373, 285, 278, 258)
111 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (306, 306, 283, 283, 366, 256)
112 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (311, 311, 306, 306, 282, 284)
113 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1) (322, 322, 286, 286, 292, 292)
114 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0) (319, 319, 319, 281, 281, 281)
115 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0) (295, 378, 290, 290, 288, 259)
116 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0) (322, 322, 299, 299, 279, 279)
117 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1) (311, 324, 293, 282, 304, 286)
118 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (306, 295, 295, 308, 308, 288)
119 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (316, 292, 298, 298, 287, 309)
120 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1,0) (327, 291, 291, 304, 280, 307)
121 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1) (323, 291, 291, 286, 286, 323)
122 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
123 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,0) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
124 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0) (325, 325, 290, 290, 285, 285)
125 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) (382, 292, 292, 287, 287, 260)
126 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0) (328, 308, 308, 290, 283, 283)
127 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (331, 311, 288, 288, 301, 281)
Table 12: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 5.
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number graph 1 2 3 4 5 6
128 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (320, 313, 295, 295, 284, 293)
129 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (315, 297, 297, 297, 297, 297)
130 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0) (120, 120, 120, 120, 120, 0)
131 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0) (293, 293, 293, 376, 286, 259)
132 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0) (309, 309, 309, 309, 282, 282)
133 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) (301, 301, 314, 290, 307, 287)
134 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (303, 303, 298, 298, 298, 300)
135 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,0) (301, 314, 314, 294, 294, 283)
136 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1) (298, 315, 293, 293, 315, 286)
137 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,1) (306, 306, 295, 295, 299, 299)
138 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1,1) (318, 291, 291, 291, 291, 318)
139 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) (317, 317, 297, 292, 292, 285)
140 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1) (320, 320, 290, 290, 290, 290)
141 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0) (380, 290, 290, 290, 290, 260)
142 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0) (318, 298, 298, 311, 291, 284)
143 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) (310, 303, 303, 292, 296, 296)
144 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (307, 304, 295, 295, 295, 304)
145 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1) (296, 296, 296, 313, 313, 286)
146 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,1) (301, 301, 301, 301, 298, 298)
147 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0) (301, 301, 305, 305, 294, 294)
148 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0) (306, 306, 306, 294, 294, 294)
149 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0) (315, 315, 295, 295, 295, 285)
150 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0) (307, 307, 300, 300, 293, 293)
151 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1) (305, 298, 298, 302, 302, 295)
152 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
153 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0) (304, 304, 304, 297, 297, 294)
154 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1) (302, 302, 299, 299, 299, 299)
155 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0) (301, 301, 301, 301, 298, 298)
156 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
Table 13: Payos according to the Myerson value for the game of example 5.1
and all non-isomorphic graphs, part 6.
